INTRODUCTION
Consider Abe and Ben, two life-long criminals. 1 Abe's criminal playground is Florida, whereas Ben spends his time breaking the law in Missouri. During the course of their respective criminal careers, they are each convicted of three "violent felonies," 2 including attempted burglary.
1. This hypothetical is loosely adapted from the facts of In re Rivero, 797 F.3d 986 (11th Cir. 2015), and Woods v. United States, 805 F.3d 1152 (8th Cir. 2015) (per curiam).
2. For a definition of "violent felony," see infra note 50 and accompanying text.
They are each arrested a fourth time and convicted of being felons in possession of a firearm. 3 This subjects each to mandatory minimum sentences of fifteen years in prison, because they have three prior violent felony convictions. 4 The federal appellate court affirms their convictions and the U.S. Supreme Court denies certiorari, rendering their convictions final. 5 End of story? Not quite. During their incarcerations, the Supreme Court limits the scope of the statute that characterizes a prior conviction as a "violent felony"-the same statute under which Abe and Ben were both sentenced. 6 Abe and Ben, each with a penchant for jailhouse lawyering, decide to collaterally challenge their sentences in federal court 7 under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. 8 But, their petitions are denied. 9 After several years, the Supreme Court holds unconstitutional the provision under which Abe and Ben were sentenced; a prior conviction of attempted burglary no longer constitutes a violent felony. 10 Thus, if Abe and Ben had been sentenced now, they would have been sentenced to a maximum of ten years, not a minimum of fifteen. 11 They both petition again under § 2255 to challenge their sentences. 12 Ben is successful but Abe is not. Because this is their second time filing § 2255 motions, the procedural threshold they must overcome is much more burdensome than the first instance threshold. 13 The federal jurisdiction in which Ben is incarcerated finds that Ben has met this threshold but the jurisdiction in which Abe finds 3. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2012) (rendering it unlawful for a felon to be in possession of a firearm); infra note 45 and accompanying text. 6. See, e.g., Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122, 130 (2009) (holding that failure to report to a penal institution is not a violent felony); Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 148 (2008) (holding that driving under the influence is not a violent felony). 7. A collateral challenge-also known as a collateral attack or collateral motion-is one that occurs after a judgment becomes final. See Brian M. Hoffstadt, Common-Law Writs and Federal Common Lawmaking on Collateral Review, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 1413, 1413 n.1 (2002) ("Collateral review refers to review subsequent to direct appeal . . . .").
8. Entitled "Federal custody; remedies on motion attacking sentence," § 2255 codifies the writ of habeas corpus for federal prisoners and provides a collateral mechanism for challenging a sentence, called a motion to "vacate, set aside or correct" a sentence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012); infra Part I.C. 9. A petition under § 2255 may be denied for various reasons unrelated to the merits of the claim, including failure to file within the one-year statute of limitations. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f).
10. See Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2563 (2015). 11. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2) (2012) (providing a maximum term of ten years imprisonment for violation of § 922(g)).
12. This is considered a "second" petition. See infra note 28. 13. In the first instance, they must satisfy the requirements of § 2255(f)(3), while in the second instance they are subject to § 2255(h)(2). himself determines that Abe has not. 14 Had Abe been incarcerated within the same jurisdiction as Ben, he too would have obtained relief. 15 Since the Supreme Court's 2015 decision in Johnson v. United States, 16 such disparate treatment of inmates across jurisdictions has become commonplace. 17 In Johnson, the Court held that a portion of the Armed Career Criminal Act 18 (ACCA), known as the "residual clause," 19 was unconstitutionally vague. 20 The ACCA is a sentencing enhancement statute that mandates a fifteen-year minimum sentence in federal prison to persons with at least three prior violent felony convictions who are subsequently convicted of being in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). 21 The now unconstitutional residual clause was a catchall phrase that expanded the definition of violent felony beyond an enumerated list also to encompass crimes punishable by a term of imprisonment of at least one year that involve "conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another." 22 Johnson held that "[i]nvoking so shapeless a provision to condemn someone to prison for 15 years to life does not comport with the Constitution's guarantee of due process." 23 The Johnson decision has already had significant implications for various areas of the law. 24 But perhaps most important is the question of to what extent inmates previously sentenced under the residual clause, and thereby unjustly serving at least five additional years in prison, may use Johnson as 14 (2015) (arguing that because the United States Sentencing Guidelines define "crime of violence" in a similar manner to the ACCA's definition of "violent felony," the Guidelines residual clause analogue should also be subject to a vagueness challenge under Johnson, and suggesting Johnson may have implications for, inter alia, restitution, mandatory life imprisonment, extradition, sex offender registration, money laundering, racketeering, restrictions on use of ammunition, and use of minors in crimes of violence); Leading Cases, Johnson v. United States, 129 HARV. L. REV. 301, 310 (2015) ("Johnson's impact may well be broader than the majority admits."); see also Press Release, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, U.S. Sentencing Commission Adopts Amendment to Definition of "Crime of Violence" in Federal Sentencing Guidelines and Proposes Additional Amendments (Jan. 8, 2016), http://www.ussc.gov/news/press-releases-and-newsadvisories/january-8-2016 (adopting amendment for the portion of the Sentencing Guidelines that resembles the residual clause) [perma.cc/ZZU7-XUEA]. a basis for resentencing or release. 25 Indeed, in the wake of Johnson, some inmates previously sentenced under the residual clause have been able to obtain relief by using the Johnson ruling as the basis of a direct appeal 26 or as the basis of an initial petition under § 2255. 27 By contrast, inmates petitioning under § 2255 for at least a second time 28 have not been uniformly granted relief, resulting in a circuit split on whether the rule announced in Johnson can be used as the basis of a new motion under § 2255. 29 The key inquiry that the courts have splintered on is whether the new rule in Johnson-that the residual clause is unconstitutionally vague-has been "made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court. While in Teague v. Lane 31 the Court described its foundational approach to retroactivity, in Tyler v. Cain 32 the Supreme Court specifically articulated the standard by which a court determines whether a rule has been "made retroactive" by the Supreme Court to cases on collateral review. 33 This inquiry is distinct from determining whether a new rule is simply "retroactive" under the Court's general retroactivity doctrine as detailed in Teague. 34 The Tyler standard for assessing whether a rule has been made retroactive has been criticized as an onerous one, 35 and its inconsistent application lies at the heart of the current circuit split.
Although scholars have extensively covered the evolution of the ACCA's tortured residual clause, 36 few have yet to examine thoroughly the circuit split on Johnson retroactivity while concurrently revisiting the Court's precedent on the retroactivity of new rules to successive petitions for writs of habeas corpus. 37 Accordingly, this Note examines the circuit split, revisits the standard outlined in Tyler, and concludes that Johnson has in fact been "made retroactive" and should thus uniformly be given retroactive effect to successive § 2255 motions. In doing so, this Note suggests a resolution to the circuit split and proposes a modified approach toward determining retroactivity for successive collateral challenges.
While the Court has recently granted certiorari on the Johnson retroactivity question and will likely decide it this term 38 Although not discussed at length herein, the avenue by which the Johnson retroactivity development as the one-year statute of limitations under § 2255 for Johnson claims is nearing expiration 39 -this Note respectfully calls on the Court to find not just that Johnson is retroactive under general retroactivity doctrine, but also that it has previously been made retroactive. Doing so would allow the Court simultaneously to cause meritorious Johnson claims to be reviewed and to remedy the Court's overall approach toward retroactivity for successive collateral challenges. 40 Accordingly, Part I of this Note provides an overview of the relevant legal background, including the ACCA, Johnson, habeas corpus, and the retroactivity doctrine. Part II addresses the circuit split on Johnson's retroactive application to successive motions under § 2255. Part III posits that Johnson has been made retroactive and discusses how a Supreme Court holding stating that it has been made retroactive will allow the Court to reframe its problematic approach toward retroactivity for successive collateral challenges. In particular, Part III argues that Johnson has been made retroactive by the Court because, to quote from key Supreme Court precedent, the rule "narrow[ed] the scope of a criminal statute by interpreting its terms." 41 Part III also proposes a modified framework that the Supreme Court might consider adopting to determine whether a new rule has been made retroactive. 42 Although this Note calls on the Court to find that Johnson was "made retroactive" in the pending Welch case, and a holding in Welch stating that Johnson is retroactive would reconcile the circuit split, this Note recognizes that the case could also theoretically-and unfortunately-leave unresolved the question of whether Johnson had already been "made retroactive." The petitioner in Welch is contesting the denial of a certificate of appealability, after a dismissal of an initial § 2255 motion. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 38, at 4. The Court could therefore feasibly hold Johnson retroactive, but not address, nor need to address, whether Johnson has been "made retroactive." Cf. Vladeck, supra note 37, at 5-6 (discussing Harrimon v. United States, a pending petition for certiorari before judgment petition on a denial of a first Johnson-based § 2255 motion that, if granted, could make Johnson retroactive but still leave open the question of whether it was "made retroactive"). For discussions of the other ways in which the Court could have specifically addressed the "made retroactive" question, see, e.g., Leah M. Litman 
A. The ACCA and the Residual Clause
The ACCA imposes a mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen years on an offender who (1) is guilty of being in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) 45 and (2) has been convicted three times for prior violent felonies or serious drug offenses. 46 Congress passed the ACCA in 1984, as a part of a larger act, in an effort to curb the number of crimes committed by repeat violent crime offenders by severely punishing their possession of firearms. 47 Congress intended that only prior crimes indicating that a felon is especially dangerous when in possession of a firearm should qualify. 48 In defining "violent felony," the statute includes both an enumerated list of violent felonies and a catchall provision. 49 The ACCA defines a violent felony as any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year . . . that-(i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another; or (ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves 43 In 2010, Samuel Johnson pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of § 922(g). 52 In light of Johnson's extensive criminal record, the Government requested an enhanced sentence under the ACCA, 53 arguing that "three of Johnson's previous offenses-including unlawful possession of a short-barreled shotgun . . . qualified as violent felonies." 54 The district court agreed with the Government and sentenced Johnson under the ACCA to the mandatory minimum fifteen years in prison. 55 While Johnson's other predicate offenses were listed in the statute, his prior offense of possession of a short-barreled shotgun was not; it fell under the residual clause. 56 After Johnson unsuccessfully appealed his sentence to the Eighth Circuit, 57 the Supreme Court granted certiorari (on direct appeal) to decide whether unlawful possession of a short-barreled shotgun qualifies as a violent felony under the residual clause of the ACCA 58 A six-justice majority held that the residual clause was void-forvagueness. 60 Recognizing that the residual clause had "'created numerous splits among the lower federal courts,' where it has proved 'nearly impossible to apply consistently,'" 61 the Court held that it was so vague that applying an increased sentence under it violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 62 The Court reasoned that two facets of the clause created "a black hole of confusion and uncertainty" 63 and rendered it unconstitutionally vague. 64 First, the residual clause fostered uncertainty about how to evaluate the risk a crime carried. 65 In applying the residual clause, judges estimated the level of risk using the "judicially imagined 'ordinary case' of a crime," and not "real-world facts or statutory elements." 66 Accordingly, the Court was unable to articulate a viable method for assessing which kind of conduct the "ordinary case" of a crime entailed. 67 Second, the residual clause presented uncertainty as to how much risk the ordinary case had to pose to be considered a violent felony. 68 Therefore, by "combining indeterminacy about how to measure the risk posed by a crime with indeterminacy about how much risk it takes for the crime to qualify as a violent felony," the Court held that "the residual clause produces more unpredictability and arbitrariness than the Due Process Clause tolerates." 69 The Court ultimately granted Johnson relief and remanded the case for further proceedings. 70 Although Johnson's successful challenge was on direct appeal of his ACCA conviction, the Supreme Court's holding opened the door to potential federal habeas corpus petitions under § 2255 by prisoners previously sentenced under the residual clause. appeal 71 is the procedural path to judicial relief, whether release or a new trial. 72 Inmates who have already lost on direct appeal may instead seek postconviction relief by petitioning for a writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum. 73 Habeas corpus, Latin for "that you have the body" 74 and known as the Great Writ, 75 is a centuries-old means for contesting the lawfulness of detention. 76 Habeas corpus is a "collateral" way for a prisoner to challenge a sentence-meaning without directly challenging substantive guilt of the offense charge. 77 Although of common law origin, the writ of habeas corpus is presently codified in several places in the U.S. Code. 78 The general provision is 28 U.S.C. § 2241, which grants the Supreme Court and lower federal courts the power to grant writs of habeas corpus. 79 For prisoners convicted of federal crimes, the more typically utilized § 2255 allows federal prisoners to collaterally challenge a sentence in federal court. 80 Section 2255 provides in pertinent part: 71. A direct appeal involves appealing the conviction and sentence to the relevant court of appeals and petitioning for a writ of certiorari from the Supreme Court. [p]ower to issue the writ of habeas corpus, 'the most celebrated writ in the English law,' was granted to the federal courts in the Judiciary Act of 1789." (quoting 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *129)).
77. See Goto v. Lane, 265 U.S. 393, 401 (1924); supra note 7; see also Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 262 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("[Habeas corpus] seeks to assure that no man has been incarcerated under a procedure which creates an impermissibly large risk that the innocent will be convicted."); RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1245 (6th ed. 2009) (noting that "habeas lies when the sentencing court lacked jurisdiction-and that jurisdiction is lacking when the statute under which the defendant was convicted is unconstitutional"). For further discussion of the Great Writ, see PAUL D. HALLIDAY, HABEAS CORPUS: FROM ENGLAND TO EMPIRE (2010 A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States . . . or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence. 81 Simply stated, § 2255 allows for an inmate to collaterally challenge 82 a sentence that was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States. 83 Nearly fifty years after the enactment of § 2255, Congress promulgated the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 84 (AEDPA), which amended § 2255 and established several statutory constraints. 85 Relevant for present purposes, AEDPA amended § 2255 to include a oneyear statute of limitations on an inmate's claim, 86 which, in the case of inmates seeking to rely on a new rule as the basis of a claim, "run[s] from . . . the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review." 87 http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ppfusd00.pdf (finding that 80 percent of federal habeas petitions filed in 2000 were from state inmates) [perma.cc/ZR4W-S7ZL]. 81. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). While a motion for resentencing or release under § 2255 provides the predominant collateral mechanism for a federal prisoner seeking postconviction relief, there are other avenues a federal prisoner could pursue-which themselves carry procedural hurdles-such as a petition under § 2241. See Bench, supra note 36, at 175; supra note 79 and accompanying text. Although rare, a federal prisoner may also seek an "extraordinary writ" from the Supreme Court, such as an original writ of habeas corpus or an original writ of mandamus. See Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 658 (1996); Litman, supra note 27; Stevenson, supra note 44, at 756-57; Vladeck, supra note 37, at 7-9. While these mechanisms are not addressed here, they are additional ways the question of whether In effect, under § 2255 an inmate can only assert a claim anchored upon a new Supreme Court ruling within one year of that ruling, so long as that ruling is retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review. 88 In addition to the one-year statute of limitations, AEDPA established several "gatekeeping" restrictions on successive § 2255 petitions. 89 As relevant here, AEDPA imposed § 2255(h)(2), which mandates that before an inmate relying on a new rule of constitutional law may move for a successive time under § 2255, the motion "must be certified as provided in section 2244 by a panel of the appropriate court of appeals to contain . . . a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable." 90 Section 2244, in turn, provides that the movant must first petition to the circuit court in the jurisdiction where he or she was sentenced for an order authorizing the district court to consider the successive motion. 91 The circuit court may only authorize the motion if it determines that the petitioner made a prima facie showing that the new rule was made retroactive by the Supreme Court per the requirements of § 2255(h)(2). 92 If such showing is made, only then will the inmate have leave to file a successive § 2255 motion with the district court. 93 Finally, the grant or denial of an authorization "shall not be appealable and shall not be the subject of a petition for rehearing or for a writ of certiorari." 94 including equitable tolling in situations involving a fundamental miscarriage of justice or actual innocence. See Litman, supra note 40, at 87.
88. See infra Part I.D (discussing AEDPA's interaction with the Court's retroactivity doctrine). An additional hurdle is procedural default. Briefly, if an inmate could have, but failed to raise a claim on direct appeal, the doctrine of procedural default prevents the inmate from raising that claim on collateral review. See Litman, supra note 27. Although Johnson was not previously available to petitioners now seeking relief for Johnson error, a petitioner would still have to establish cause and prejudice for failing to raise the claim previously. See id. Nevertheless, the Government has been waiving such procedural arguments on defaulted Johnson claims. See id.
89. See Vladeck, supra note 37, at 1; Entzeroth, supra note 28, at 90. 90. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(2) (emphasis added). Note that the emphasized language is similar, although not identical, to the retroactivity language in § 2255(f)(3 . Furthermore, the court of appeals shall grant or deny the authorization "not later than 30 days after the filing of the motion." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(a)(3)(D).
93. See Entzeroth, supra note 28, at 90 ("Under the certification process of the AEDPA, the circuit courts of appeals serve a 'gatekeeping' function, and keep the courthouse doors closed unless an individual meets the narrow criteria of new evidence or new constitutional law entitling one to a second or successive motion. . . . [I]ts function is to prevent a hearing on the merits.").
94. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(a)(3)(E).
These austere retroactivity provisions 95 significantly limit the availability of collateral relief even on a colorable claim of a new rule, especially on a successive collateral challenge. 96 Before examining how the Supreme Court has most recently interpreted these retroactivity requirements, this Note turns to a discussion of the retroactivity doctrine generally.
D. The Retroactivity Doctrine Dictates Whether New Rules May Be Applied to Habeas Corpus Petitions
The retroactivity doctrine is instrumental in determining whether a court will review an initial or successive § 2255 motion, assuming the motions are anchored on a new rule of constitutional law made by the Supreme Court. 97 Current retroactivity doctrine dictates that newly decided rules of constitutional law should not, save for certain exceptions, be available to defendants whose convictions have become final prior to the new rule's announcement. 98 The retroactivity doctrine-along with AEDPA-is consequently a substantial barrier to federal habeas petitions. 99 This section begins by providing a brief discussion of the early retroactivity doctrine in Part I.D.1, before examining the modern Teague approach in Part I. 
The Early Retroactivity Doctrine
Traditionally, new rules applied without distinction to cases on both direct and collateral review. 100 Under this traditional view of retroactivity, judges did not create new law, but rather discovered and applied preexisting law. 101 Accordingly, the idea that a particular rule of law did not apply across the board to all cases was anathema. 102 But this view severely constrained the capacity for the Supreme Court to recognize revolutionary new rules, especially in the federal constitutional criminal procedure context. 103 And so it came under attack in the mid-twentieth century during the Warren Court era. 104 The Warren Court's doctrinal solution was articulated in Linkletter v. Walker. 105 The specific question in Linkletter was whether the new exclusionary rule derived from Mapp v. Ohio 106 should apply to state criminal cases on federal collateral review. 107 The Court devised a threeprong balancing test involving an examination of the prior history of the rule, its purpose and effect, and whether retroactive application would advance its operation. 108 This case-by-case approach was theoretically useful because it enabled the Court to continue expanding criminal defendants' rights without the danger of a flood of habeas petitions from previously sentenced defendants, as there was then no statute of limitations on habeas petitions. 109 The functional result of the Linkletter standard, however, was disparate treatment of similarly situated individuals and arbitrary retroactive application of new rules. 110 that "the cost of correcting a sentencing error is far less than the cost of a retrial" because "resentencing is a brief event, normally taking less than a day and requiring the attendance of only the defendant, counsel, and court personnel"); Russell, supra note 79, at 82-83 ("Concerns about finality are much less pressing when a court reconsiders the length of a sentence rather than the validity of a conviction."); id. at 135 carve out two exceptions to the general presumption of nonretroactivity on collateral review: (1) if the new rule places "certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the criminal law-making authority to proscribe," 118 or (2) if the new rule "requires the observance of 'those procedures that . . . are "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."'" 119 The Supreme Court has on several occasions elaborated on Teague's first exception to nonretroactivity. 120 The first such elaboration came in Penry v. Lynaugh, 121 where the Court was faced with deciding whether the execution of the mentally handicapped is unconstitutional and, if so, whether that decision was retroactively applicable to the petitioner's claim on collateral review. 122 The Court held that "the first exception set forth in Teague should be understood to cover not only rules forbidding criminal punishment of certain primary conduct but also rules prohibiting a certain category of punishment for a class of defendants because of their status or offense." 123 While the Court ultimately ruled that executing the mentally handicapped was not unconstitutional (at the time), 124 its discussion of Teague's first exception remains good law. 125 In nonretroactivity rule is only applicable to procedural rules, not "to the situation in which th[e] Court decides the meaning of a criminal statute enacted by Congress," which is substantive in nature. 129 The Court then relied on the doctrinal foundations of habeas corpus to draw an analogy as to why substantive rules, similar to certain procedural rules exempt from nonretroactivity under Teague, are also entitled to retroactive application. 130 The Court asserted that the Teague exceptions are founded upon a principle function of habeas corpus-"to assure that no man has been incarcerated under a procedure which creates an impermissibly large risk that the innocent will be convicted." 131 The Court then asserted that much like the Teague exceptions, including "decisions placing conduct 'beyond the . . . law-making authority to proscribe,'" 132 decisions holding that a federal criminal statute does not reach certain conduct are also retroactive. 133 This is so because their retroactive application similarly advances a core principle of habeas corpus-mitigating "a significant risk that a defendant stands convicted of an 'act that the law does not make criminal.'" 134 The Court therefore determined that "the doctrinal underpinnings of habeas review" supported the retroactive application of Bailey to the petitioner's claim." 135 In short, Bousley provides that a substantive change in law is retroactive. 136 "using" a firearm during a drug trafficking crime was not fully informed and therefore unlawful. See id. at 617-18. Although Bailey did not provide a new rule of constitutional law, and hence would not qualify for application to a successive motion under § 2255, this was a first § 2255 motion, and that requirement was not implicated. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(2) (2012) (requiring new rules to be constitutional in nature for use on successive motions), with id. § 2255(f)(3) (exhibiting no such requirement for using new rules on initial motions).
129. Bousley, 523 U.S. at 620. The Court essentially combined the two Teague exceptions into one: certain procedural rules, such as those that place certain conduct beyond the lawmaking authority to proscribe, and watershed rules of criminal procedure, are entitled to retroactive application. After combining the two Teague exceptions into one, the Court simultaneously created an additional species of retroactive rules: rules that are substantive. (1974)). By citing Davis, the Court invoked an older case that, in addressing whether a certain claim was cognizable on collateral review, discussed the core purposes of habeas corpus. See Davis, 417 U.S. at 346-47 (holding the petitioner's claim-that he was convicted for an act that the law does not make criminal-is cognizable under § 2255 because a core function of habeas is to protect against such risks); see also Doherty, supra note 101, at 460 ("The importance of the distinction between substance and procedure in the habeas context is rooted in concern for the principal function of habeas corpus relief, which is to assure that an innocent person will not stay convicted or incarcerated under a law that is no longer criminal."); supra note 77 and accompanying text.
135. Bousley, 523 U.S. at 621. 136. See Entzeroth, supra note 5, at 197 ("Bousley appeared to provide that changes in substantive law would not be subject to the Teague analysis and, as such, substantive decisions would apply to cases pending in habeas review."); Doherty, supra note 101, at 460 n.87 ("Bousley stands for the proposition that a change in substantive law must be given retroactive affect [sic] ."). At least one scholar, however, points out that the holding of In Schriro v. Summerlin, 137 the Court echoed its Bousley approach to the Teague doctrine. In Summerlin, the petitioner collaterally challenged his death penalty sentence, arguing that the new rule announced in Ring v. Arizona 138 rendered his sentence unlawful. 139 The Court found that Ring was not entitled to retroactive effect because it was not substantive and did not meet the Teague exceptions. 140 But more importantly, the Court reiterated its ruling in Bousley, stating new substantive rules, including "decisions that narrow the scope of a criminal statute by interpreting its terms, as well as constitutional determinations that place particular conduct or persons covered by the statute beyond the State's power to punish," generally apply retroactively. 141 Such rules, the Court emphasized, are entitled to retroactive effect "because they 'necessarily carry a significant risk that a defendant stands convicted of an act that the law does not make criminal' or faces a punishment that the law cannot impose upon him." 142 In the days leading up to this Note's publication, the Supreme Court's retroactivity jurisprudence evolved again with the Court's decision in Montgomery v. Louisiana. 143 The Court reemphasized that Teague's first exception stands for the proposition that substantive rules are entitled to retroactive effect. 144 The Court also stated that Teague requires the retroactive application of new substantive rules 145 I]n addition to performing any analysis required by AEDPA, a federal court considering a habeas petition must conduct a threshold Teague analysis when the issue is properly raised."); Doherty, supra note 101, at 465 ("[T]he Teague analysis remains a seminal inquiry in analyzing retroactivity."); Scott, supra note 117, at 190 ("The Supreme Court . . . has consistently applied Teague's nonretroactivity approach to collateral attacks on sentences."). In fact, there is a presumption that at some level, AEDPA codified Teague. See Entzeroth, supra note 5, at 198 ("Congress used concepts and incorporated language from Teague in several specific attempts to restrict the scope of habeas review."); Zarrow & Milliken, supra note 95, at 933 n. 16 Tyler is the chief case addressing the retroactivity of new rules to successive habeas petitions. In Tyler, the Court was tasked with determining, under AEDPA, whether Cage v. Louisiana 154 was entitled to retroactive effect on a successive collateral challenge. 155 The 5-4 Court determined that the new rule had not been made retroactive by the Supreme Court because the Court had not expressly held Cage to be retroactive. 156 The Court interpreted the word "made" to mean "held" and established that the requirements for successive collateral challenges are only satisfied when the Court expressly holds a new rule to be retroactive. 157 The Court further implied that even if Cage-or any new rule-superficially met one of the Teague exceptions, it still would not be made retroactive unless the Court expressly held so. 158 Moreover, the Court held that a rule is not made retroactive if the Court establishes principles of retroactivity and leaves the finding of retroactivity to the lower courts. 159 Such a strict interpretation of the statute was necessary, the Court reasoned, "for the proper implementation of the collateral review structure created by AEDPA" because the thirty-day time limit for considering authorizations to file successive habeas motions implies that the lower courts were not intended 154. 498 U.S. 39 (1990) (per curiam) (finding unconstitutional a jury instruction that could have been interpreted to allow for conviction without proof beyond a reasonable doubt).
155. Tyler, 533 U.S. at 658-59. The inmate in Tyler filed a successive motion under § 2254, which is the state analogue to § 2255. See supra note 80. Accordingly, the Court in Tyler interpreted the "made retroactive by the Supreme Court" language as stated in § 2244(b)(2)(A) and in the state context. See supra note 91 and accompanying text. Nevertheless, the language in § 2244(b)(2)(A) also applies to federal prisoners seeking to file successive motions under § 2255 and is identical to the threshold language in § 2255(h)(2). See supra notes 89-93 and accompanying text. Thus, the holding in Tyler also applies to the federal successive habeas context. See Hoffstadt, supra note 7, at 1489 n.430 ("Tyler involved an interpretation of § 2244, but its holding presumably would apply to § 2255, given the same statutory language.").
156. See Tyler, 533 U.S. at 663-64. 157. See id. The Court decided that "made" meant "held," in part through reliance on an earlier Supreme Court case that invoked a strict reading of a different provision of AEDPA. See id. at 664 ("To be sure, the statute uses the word 'made,' not 'held.' But we have already stated, in a decision interpreting another provision of AEDPA, that Congress need not use the word 'held' to require as much." (referring to Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000) (holding the phrase "clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," in § 2254(d)(1) refers to holdings of the Supreme Court))). Therefore, Tyler is not the only Supreme Court case to produce a conservative reading of AEDPA. to employ "the difficult legal analysis" necessary to resolve questions of retroactivity. 160 The Court did, however, remark that multiple holdings may be used to surmise the retroactivity of a new rule, but "only if the holdings in those cases necessarily dictate" that result. 161 In her Tyler concurrence, Justice O'Connor agreed with the majority that the clearest instance of when the Court has made a rule retroactive is when the Court has expressly held that the new rule is retroactive. 162 Justice O'Connor emphasized, however, as did Justice Breyer writing for the fourjustice dissent, that two or more cases can logically dictate that a new rule has been made retroactive by the Supreme Court:
[A] single case that expressly holds a rule to be retroactive is not a sine qua non for the satisfaction of this statutory provision. This Court instead may "ma[k]e" a new rule retroactive through multiple holdings that logically dictate the retroactivity of the new rule. To apply the syllogistic relationship described by Justice Breyer, if we hold in Case One that a particular type of rule applies retroactively to cases on collateral review and hold in Case Two that a given rule is of that particular type, then it necessarily follows that the given rule applies retroactively to cases on collateral review. In such circumstances, we can be said to have "made" the given rule retroactive to cases on collateral review. 163 Justice O'Connor further explained that the Court can be said to have made a rule retroactive "only where the Court's holdings logically permit no other conclusion than that the rule is retroactive." 164 Justice O'Connor also invoked Teague's first exception to provide an "easy to demonstrate" example of the multiple holdings principle: "When the Court holds as a new rule in a subsequent case that a particular species of primary, private individual conduct is beyond the power of the criminal lawmaking authority to proscribe, it necessarily follows that this Court has 'made' that new rule retroactive to cases on collateral review." 165 ("[A]lthough AEDPA seems to explicitly require that the Supreme Court make a rule retroactive . . . this requirement has not been consistently applied by the lower courts. The more common practice is for lower courts to discern whether the Supreme Court would have found a decision to be retroactive and deny or grant a petition on that basis."); Vladeck, supra note 37, at 4 ("[A]fter Tyler, lower courts have generally agreed that, if a new rule is
Criticisms of Tyler
The Tyler decision has been criticized on several grounds, including its effect on Congress's intent in promulgating AEDPA and its highly preclusive effect on successive habeas petitions. 167 AEDPA's legislative history suggests that Congress indeed intended to make it harder for successive petitions to be reviewed, but query whether Congress intended the Tyler majority's exacting interpretation of the statute. 168 (1996) ("This title incorporates reforms to curb the abuse of . . . habeas corpus . . . . Successive petitions must be approved by a panel of the court of appeals and are limited to those petitions that . . . involve new constitutional rights that have been retroactively applied by the Supreme Court."). Congress was also concerned with preventing "successive bites at the apple," that is, multiple habeas petitions by the same petitioner. See, e.g., 141 Cong. Rec. 14,734 (1995) (statement of Sen. Feinstein) ("[T]his bill provides habeas petitioners with one bite of the apple. It assures that no one convicted of a capital crime will be barred from seeking habeas relief in Federal court . . . [and] it appropriately limits second and subsequent habeas appeals to narrow and appropriate circumstances."); 137 Cong. Rec. 16,538 (1991) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (recognizing a problem when prisoners take "a 10th bite of the apple, even a 20th bite of the apple").
169. See Stevenson, supra note 44, at 772-73 ("Congress intended to ensure that petitioners would have at least one full, fair opportunity to raise each meritorious claim . . . . [But] those who voted for the legislation surely did not anticipate or intend the severe ripple effects that the preclusive successive petition rules have had . . . ."); see also id. at 771 (arguing that Congress likely did not intend to constrict successive federal habeas corpus in a way that prejudices meritorious claims that can only be litigated on successive collateral review). Indeed, AEDPA was hastily drafted after the Oklahoma City bombing and has not "been hailed as an epitome of sophisticated statutory drafting." Angela Ellis, "Is Innocence Irrelevant" to AEDPA's Statute of Limitations? Avoiding a Miscarriage of Justice in Federal Habeas Corpus, 56 VILL. L. REV. 129, 148 (2011); see Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997) ("[I]n a world of silk purses and pigs' ears, the Act is not a silk purse of the art of statutory drafting."). It is therefore not unfathomable that the hasty creation of the act unintentionally led to the Tyler holding.
170. Zarrow & Milliken, supra note 95, at 981; see also supra note 151 and accompanying text.
171. See Stevenson, supra note 44, at 710-11 ("The substantive standard that this 'gatekeeping panel' is to apply . . . is far more restrictive and unforgiving than its antecedent.").
O'Connor's multiple holdings approach are in tension. On the one hand, the Court has stated that only the Court itself can make a rule retroactive under § 2244(b)(2)(A) through an express holding to that effect. 172 On the other hand, the majority suggested, and both Justice O'Connor and the dissent agreed, that multiple holdings can logically dictate the Court has held a new rule retroactive. 173 Finally, Justice O'Connor's easy examplethat a rule is made retroactive when it is a type contemplated by Teague's first exception-only further obfuscates the inquiry. 174 Although there is a dearth of scholarship on Tyler, the existing scholarly reactions to the decision are largely critical of its narrow interpretation of § 2244(b)(2)(A). 175 182 The current circuit split on Johnson retroactivity exemplifies this inequity.
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT ON JOHNSON RETROACTIVITY
Before Johnson, inmates petitioning for habeas relief founded on erroneous applications of the residual clause generally relied on a line of cases that began with Begay v. United States. 183 The ruling in Johnson, however, has supplanted those cases as the basis for habeas relief from sentences imposed under the residual clause. 184 Inmates sentenced under the residual clause now have a new, and certainly more salient, argument for relief-they were deprived of due process of law.
The circuit split on whether the new rule announced in Johnson can be used in successive petitions under § 2255 and overcome the § 2255(h)(2) approval requirement 185 serves as a major impediment to petitioners in certain jurisdictions. 186 As of the writing of this Note, the First, Second, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have authorized successive habeas petitions and found that Johnson has been made retroactive by the Supreme Court under § 2255(h)(2) and Tyler. 187 On the other hand, the [Vol. 84 Fifth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have denied authorizations on the ground that Johnson has not been made retroactive by the Supreme Court. 188 Accordingly, Part II.A examines select decisions from several of the circuits that have held that Johnson has been made retroactive, and Part II.B examines select decisions from the circuits that have found that Johnson has not been made retroactive. 189
A. The Majority View: The Supreme Court Has Made
Johnson Retroactive to Cases on Collateral Review
Although the Seventh, Sixth, First, and Eighth Circuits agree that Johnson has been made retroactive, they are not in complete agreement as to why. Part II.A.1 details Seventh and Sixth Circuit opinions holding that Johnson has been made retroactive. Part II.A.2 highlights First and Eighth Circuit opinions granting authorization to file successive § 2255 motions based primarily on the Government's concession that Johnson has been made retroactive.
The Seventh and Sixth Circuits: Johnson Was Made Retroactive Under Tyler
The Seventh Circuit was the first federal appellate court to rule on whether Johnson can be applied retroactively to a successive § 2255 motion. In Price v. United States, 190 Price was convicted in 2006 of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). 191 Price had three prior convictions that qualified him for the ACCA's sentencing enhancement, 192 and the court sentenced him to twenty years and ten months imprisonment, 193 a term exceeding the fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentence under the ACCA. 194 Price's sentence was affirmed on direct appeal and his subsequent § 2255 motion was denied. 195 After the Supreme Court decided Johnson, Price petitioned the Seventh Circuit to authorize the district court to entertain a successive § 2255 its holding in In re Gieswein, and indicating that the Government believes that Johnson has been made retroactive); Litman, supra note 40, at 82.
188. See, e.g., In re Williams, 806 F.3d 322, 324 (5th Cir. 2015); In re Gieswein, 802 F.3d 1143, 1148-49 (10th Cir. 2015) (per curiam); Rivero, 797 F.3d at 989. As of this writing, only Williams holds that Johnson is not retroactive under Teague. Although scholars believe Johnson is retroactive under Teague, they are not in agreement that it has been made retroactive. See, e.g., Litman, supra note 29, at 48-49 (arguing that Johnson is retroactive under Teague but conceding uncertainty on whether it has been made retroactive); Vladeck, supra note 37 (arguing the Court should make Johnson retroactive but not weighing in on whether it has already done so).
189. The cases this part discusses were selected because they were either the first cases in their circuits to encounter the issue or were the first to provide substantive analysis beyond that of a summary order granting or denying authorization. motion 196 on the basis that his prior sentence, invoked under the unconstitutional residual clause, was unlawful. 197 In determining whether to authorize Price's successive motion, the court first engaged in a Teague analysis and established that the Johnson rule was one of constitutional law because it "rests on the notice requirement of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment" to the Constitution. 198 The court next found that the rule was a new rule, because it was not dictated by prior precedent nor previously available to Price. 199 The court then determined that Johnson was also a substantive rule, because in striking down the residual clause, the Court prohibited a "certain category of punishment for a class of defendants because of their status." 200 The court held that a prisoner sentenced under the residual clause thus bears substantial risk of receiving "a punishment that the law cannot impose upon him." 201 In finally determining that Johnson was "made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court," 202 the court reasoned that the Supreme Court need not expressly hold Johnson retroactive. 203 The court relied on Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Tyler, 204 which stated that the Court can make a rule retroactive "through multiple holdings that logically dictate the retroactivity of the new rule." 205 As such, and because Justice O'Connor in Tyler explained that when the Court creates a new rule protecting a particular class of primary conduct from the criminal lawmaking authority's power to proscribe, 206 the Price court recognized that "it necessarily follows that [the Supreme Court] has 'made'" the new substantive Johnson rule retroactive. 207 The Price court, in essence, used the Bousley and Summerlin expansions of Teague's first exception 208 to characterize Johnson as substantive and as one of the easy cases that Justice O'Connor has said the Court has necessarily made retroactive. In sum, because of the substantive nature of the Johnson rule, the court reasoned that the Supreme Court had made Johnson retroactive. 209 The Sixth Circuit, in In re Watkins, 210 took a similar approach. Like the other circuits to consider the issue, the court first asserted that Johnson announced a new rule of constitutional law that was previously unavailable to the petitioner. 211 The court then invoked Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Tyler and determined that the Johnson rule fell within the easy to demonstrate logical relationships that Justice O'Connor articulated. 212 Accordingly, the court held that because Johnson disallows "the imposition of an increased sentence on those defendants whose status as armed career criminals is dependent on offenses that fall within the residual clause . . . ' [t] here is no escaping the logical conclusion that the [Supreme] Court itself has made Johnson categorically retroactive to cases on collateral review.'" 213
The First and Eighth Circuits: Accepting the Government's Concession of Retroactivity
Like the Seventh Circuit, the First Circuit in Pakala v. United States 214 authorized a petitioner's request to file a successive § 2255 motion based on Johnson. 215 In Pakala, the Government conceded that the petitioner "ha[d] at least made a prima facie showing that Johnson ha[d] been made retroactive by the Supreme Court." 216 In light of this concession, the court authorized the motion, but noted that the Johnson retroactivity question has divided the circuit courts. 217 The Eighth Circuit has also authorized a petitioner's request to file a successive § 2255 motion alleging Johnson error. 218 In Woods v. United States, 219 the court granted deference to the Government's position that Johnson has been made retroactive: "Here, the United States concedes that Johnson is retroactive, and it joins Woods's motion. Based on the [G]overnment's concession, we conclude that Woods has made a prima facie showing" that Johnson has been made retroactive. 220 In a subsequent case, however, the Eighth Circuit again granted authorization to a petitioner but qualified its position on Johnson retroactivity: "The district courtunencumbered by the 'stringent time limit' that applies to the court of appeals-should [consider] the views of the other circuit courts." 221 In 
B. The Minority View: The Supreme Court Has Not Made Johnson Retroactive to Cases on Collateral Review
In contrast to the aforementioned circuits, the Eleventh and Tenth Circuits have held that Johnson has not been made retroactive, and the Fifth Circuit has gone so far as to suggest that Johnson is not retroactive under Teague. 222 Part II.B.1 begins with the Eleventh Circuit's viewpoint that no series of holdings dictate that Johnson has been made retroactive, and Part II.B.2 addresses the Tenth Circuit's textualist reasoning that led to its determination that Johnson has not been made retroactive. Finally, Part II.B.3 details the Fifth Circuit's outlier opinion.
The Eleventh Circuit: Johnson Has Not Been Made Retroactive Under Tyler
In In re Rivero, 223 the petitioner was found guilty of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). 224 In 2015, following the ruling in Johnson, Rivero filed an application with the Eleventh Circuit seeking an order permitting the district court to entertain a successive motion under § 2255. 225 The court began by conceding that Johnson announced a new substantive constitutional rule, because it "narrow[ed] the scope of [ §] 924(e) by interpreting its terms, specifically, the term violent felony." 226 The court recognized, however, that under Tyler only the Supreme Court can make a new rule retroactive and that when it does so, "it does so unequivocally, in gatekeeping requirements are jurisdictional, and some courts have held that they are, a court must decide for itself if the rule has been made retroactive. See id.
222. This is the minority view even among the circuit courts denying authorizations. See Litman, supra note 27.
223. 797 F.3d 986 (11th Cir. 2015). As of this writing, the Rivero court has sua sponte appointed counsel for the petitioner and ordered briefing on the Johnson retroactivity question. See Order at 1-2, In re Rivero, No. 15-13089 (11th Cir. Sept. 14, 2015) . This section, however, only considers the opinion denying authorization for failing to make a prima facie showing that Johnson has been made retroactive. Because the dissenting opinion provides exceptional insight into the argument that Johnson has been made retroactive, this section discusses the dissent's counter arguments to the majority's points in corresponding footnotes.
224 the form of a holding." 227 Although the court recognized, like the Price court, that a rule could be made retroactive through multiple holdings that logically dictate the rule's retroactivity, 228 the court nevertheless found that no combination of holdings necessarily dictated that Johnson was made retroactive. 229 The court also suggested that there are only "two types of new substantive rules of constitutional law" that the Supreme Court has "necessarily dictated" apply retroactively on collateral review: new rules that prohibit the punishment of certain primary conduct, which place specific conduct or persons covered by a statute beyond the state's power to punish, 230 and new rules that prohibit "a category of punishment for certain offenders or offenses." 231 The court subsequently reasoned that the Johnson rule neither prohibits Congress from punishing a criminal who has a prior conviction for attempted burglary nor prohibits Congress from increasing that criminal's sentence because of his prior conviction. 232 In short, the Rivero court did not find that Johnson prevents a defendant from facing a punishment that the law cannot impose upon him. 233 The majority responded to the dissent's argument-that Bousley logically dictates that Johnson was made retroactive-by asserting that in Bousley the Court did not apply a new constitutional rule; rather, it applied a new rule that narrowed the scope of a criminal statute by interpreting its 227 individuals may still be sentenced to fifteen years in prison for possession of a firearm, albeit not under a vague statute. 253 The court then discussed Bousley, but instead of examining it in the context of the Teague exceptions, it proceeded to rebut the Rivero dissent's argument that Bousley logically dictates Johnson retroactivity. 254 The court asserted that Bousley does not control the Johnson retroactivity inquiry because the rule announced in Bousley emerged from the Court's interpretation of a statute-which is substantive and not subject to Teague-while Johnson resulted in the complete invalidation of a statutewhich the Williams court likened to a new procedural rule. 255 In sum, with the exception of the Williams decision, the cases discussed in this part reveal that the courts of appeals are largely in agreement that Johnson announced a new substantive constitutional rule that is retroactive under Teague and should be applied to initial collateral challenges. They are split, though, over whether Johnson has been made retroactive by the Supreme Court so as to permit its utilization on successive collateral challenges. With the circuit split explored, this Note next puts forth a solution to the split and to the overall approach to retroactivity for successive collateral challenges. step in recalibrating the overall approach to assessing retroactivity for successive habeas petitions. If the Court were to then take an additional step and find that Johnson falls within the easy example articulated by Justice O'Connor in her Tyler concurrence, the Court would effectively reframe its whole approach to retroactivity for successive habeas petitions and abrogate the problem-ridden Tyler majority method. 259 By emphasizing Justice O'Connor's easy example of when a rule has logically been made retroactive as the standard by which a court determines whether a rule is made retroactive under AEDPA, the Court would establish that when it announces a new substantive rule in accordance with the Teague doctrine-like the rule in Johnson-the Court has simultaneously made the rule retroactive. Such an approach would effectively cause the Tyler majority's method to collapse back into its Teague origins, rendering Teague once again the primary, and only, inquiry for assessing retroactivity for successive collateral challenges. 260 In effect, this would place the "made retroactive" determination in the hands of the lower courts and allow them to assess retroactivity in accordance with Teague principles and without waiting for a Supreme Court holding specifically addressing the new rule's retroactivity. 261 Ultimately, this approach would liberalize a portion of the overly restrictive successive petition statutes and allow for easier successive collateral review of meritorious claims based on new constitutional rules. 262 By demonstrating that Bousley logically dictates that Johnson is substantive and retroactive, Part III.A posits that the Supreme Court has made Johnson retroactive to cases on collateral review. In doing so, Part III.A also rebuts the arguments made by the courts that have held that Johnson has not been made retroactive. 263 
III. A PROPOSED RESOLUTION TO THE CIRCUIT SPLIT

A. The Multiple Holdings Approach
As a preliminary matter, Johnson is retroactive under general retroactivity doctrine as established by Teague and its progeny. 264 First, Johnson announced a new rule, as it was not dictated by prior precedent nor was it previously available. 265 The Johnson rule is also one of constitutional law, because it stems from the Court's determination that the residual clause violated the Due Process Clause of the Constitution. 266 Furthermore, the Johnson rule is exempt from nonretroactivity because it is substantive per Teague's first exception. 267 As exemplified by Bousley and restated in Summerlin, Johnson narrows the scope of a criminal statute-on constitutional grounds-by interpreting its terms, which is necessarily a substantive rule because failure to apply it carries a significant risk that a defendant will face "a punishment that the law cannot impose upon him." 268 But has Johnson been made retroactive? While the Court in Tyler established that the word "made" is equivalent to "held," 269 the majority stated-and Justice O'Connor's concurrence and the dissent emphasizedthat a new rule can be been made retroactive through a series of holdings that logically dictate that result. 270 This is precisely the situation at bar. In Bousley, the Court held that rules limiting the scope of a criminal statute by narrowing its terms are retroactive. 271 In Johnson, the Court narrowed the scope of a criminal statute. 272 (2015); Litman, supra note 29, at 47. The Williams court argued that the distinction between a decision narrowing the terms of a statute and complete invalidation of a statute is enough to break any chain of logic between Bousley and Johnson. See Williams, 806 F.3d at 326. But this is merely a distinction without a difference. See Litman, supra note 29, at 47 ("It is hard to see how a decision 'interpreting' ACCA's scope would be substantive, but a decision invalidating ACCA's residual clause-which also alters ACCA's scope-would not be. Both . . . decisions modify the elements of an offense and alter a defendant's eligibility for a 15-year term of imprisonment.").
273. While this section emphasizes that Bousley logically dictates that Johnson was made retroactive, it is also feasible that the Court's recent Montgomery decision, see supra notes 143-47 and accompanying text, which states that Teague and the Constitution require the retroactive application of substantive rules, also dictates that the Court has made the substantive Johnson rule retroactive, see Montgomery, 2016 WL 280758, at *6, *7.
274. Cf. supra notes 233, 237 (describing the Rivero dissent's argument that Bousley logically dictates that Johnson was made retroactive). The Rivero and Williams courts' rejection of this approach is flawed because both courts declined to analyze the Bousley rule as articulated in Summerlin and to recognize that rules that narrow the scope of a criminal statute operate retroactively because failure to apply them carries the risk that a defendant would face a punishment that the law cannot impose upon him. See Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 352 (2004) ; see also supra Parts I.D.2, II. Furthermore, the Rivero court's argument that Bousley cannot logically dictate Johnson's retroactivity, because Bousley did not announce a new rule of constitutional law, is also misplaced. See In re Rivero, 797 F.3d 986, 992 (11th Cir. 2015). The court understood Summerlin to require that a decision interpreting a statute also announce a constitutional rule and therefore concluded that because the Bousley rule is not constitutional, it cannot dictate the retroactivity of the constitutional Johnson rule. See id. But the Summerlin Court did not hold as such, and the Tyler court did not suggest that the multiple holdings approach requires all holdings involved to be constitutional in nature. See generally Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348; Tyler, 533 U.S. 656; supra note 237. The Gieswein court's conservative approach-framed by plain meaning statutory interpretation and a close reading of Tyler-also falls short. See In re Gieswein, 802 F.3d 1143, 1146-49 (10th Cir. 2015). While logical, it disregards the multiple holdings method that all of the justices in Tyler endorsed to varying degrees of warmth. See supra Part I.D.3. Finally, the Williams court's analysis is flawed because Johnson is not a procedural rule that is barred from retroactive application under Justice O'Connor used in her easy example is identical to the language used by the Court in Teague to describe the first exception, 277 which entitles certain rules to retroactive effect because they "assure that no man has been incarcerated under a procedure which creates an impermissibly large risk that the innocent will be convicted." 278 The first exception has since evolved into the substantive rule exception. 279 The Court applies substantive rules retroactively because failure to do so would denature the core purposes of habeas corpus. 280 Indeed, in Teague and its progeny, the Court has routinely invoked the common theme of habeas corpus's purpose when determining the retroactivity of new rules. 281 Accordingly, if one reads Justice O'Connor's easy example to stand for the proposition that rules falling within Teague's first exception have necessarily been made retroactive, 282 and one simultaneously grafts the Court's analogy in Bousley upon Justice O'Connor's reasoning, 283 what survives is the notion that substantive rules-like those that limit the reach of statutes and the application of which serve the core functions of habeas corpus 284 -have also necessarily been made retroactive. Applying this method to the instant situation, the substantive rule announced in Johnson is entitled to retroactive effect on successive collateral challenges because failure to do so would impede habeas corpus's remedial purpose. 285 Johnson invalidated a criminal statute on constitutional grounds, thus limiting the ability of the government to punish certain career offenders erroneously as violent felons and impose fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentences on these individuals. See Litman, supra note 29, at 47. This type of error, i.e., sentencing above the statutory maximum and under an unconstitutional statute, is precisely the type of error that habeas is designed to protect against. See supra notes 77, 134 and accompanying text. The Price and Watkins courts employed similar reasoning, concluding that the new rule in Johnson fell squarely within the first Teague exception and was thus made retroactive. See supra Part II.A.1. The Rivero dissent also proffered this same argument in describing Johnson as having been made retroactive. See supra Part II.B.1. Although these courts relied on Justice O'Connor's easy to demonstrate example as a basis for the deduction that Johnson has been made retroactive, no court called specifically for an expansion of the easy example, and both courts invoked iterations of Penry language in their reasoning. See supra Part II. This Note adheres to a broader view of Teague-that substantive rules operate retroactively.
286. The Supreme Court's recent Montgomery decision further supports expanding Justice O'Connor's easy example to mean that substantive rules have necessarily been made retroactive. See Montgomery v. Louisiana, No. 14-280, 2016 WL 280758, at *6, *7 (U.S. Jan. 25, 2016). Indeed, if, as the Court articulated in Montgomery, the Constitution requires the retroactive application of substantive rules in state collateral review courts because it is [Vol. 84
The additional functional result of this approach would be that Teague would once against govern the inquiry for assessing the retroactivity of new rules for successive collateral challenges. This is so because a court would need only to determine whether a new rule is substantive under Teague in deciding whether it qualifies for retroactive effect on successive challenges. 287 In fact, this result is consistent with the Court's own retroactivity practice.
From a pragmatic perspective, it would be counterintuitive for the Court to hold that a substantive rule has not been made retroactive unless the rule was not retroactive under Teague to begin with. Consider Tyler: while there the Court found that Cage was not made retroactive and declined to address the question of whether the rule was retroactive generally under Teague, it appears that the Court would not have found Cage retroactive under Teague if presented with the question. 288 Perhaps the Court was manifesting the view that if a rule falls within the Teague exceptions, the Court has made it retroactive, while if a rule does not fall within the Teague exceptions, the Court has not made it retroactive. 289
C. The Policy Implications of Finding That Johnson Was Made Retroactive
Finding that Johnson has been made retroactive under the multiple holdings approach will immediately benefit those with viable Johnson claims. But finding further that Johnson falls within Justice O'Connor's easy example-which the Court can do this Term in Welch-will set a precedent ensuring that future meritorious claims founded on new constitutional rules can be afforded due consideration on successive collateral review without being barred by an overly restrictive interpretation of § 2255(h)(2). 290 unconstitutional to detain individuals for conduct that is beyond the law making authority to proscribe, it necessarily follows that substantive rules must be given retroactive effect in federal collateral review courts, regardless of whether a petition is initial or successive. See Montgomery, 2016 WL 280758, at *7 ("[T]he Constitution requires substantive rules to have retroactive effect regardless of when a conviction became final."). Thus, by considering new substantive rules to be made retroactive, a result the Court could effect by liberally interpreting Justice O'Connor's easy example of the multiple holdings principle, the Court would avoid constitutional issues that might otherwise occur if substantive claims on successive § 2255 motions are denied under the current regime.
287. See supra Part I.D.2 (discussing the development of the substantive rule exception). 288. See supra note 158. 289. Although perhaps post hoc ergo propter hoc logic, this proposition finds support in the fact that on another occasion, the Court declined to decide whether a prior rule was made retroactive. See In re Smith, 526 U.S. 1157 (1999) (denying a petition for an original writ of habeas corpus). Professor Stephen Vladeck suggests that the Court denied the writ and the opportunity to decide whether the rule at issue had been made retroactive "perhaps because, so soon after AEDPA, it hoped that cases presenting such circumstances would be rare (and perhaps because the 'new rule' at issue turned out to not be retroactive)." See Vladeck, supra note 37, at 8.
290. See supra Part I.D.4 (discussing the drawbacks of the strict Tyler interpretation of the successive collateral challenge bar).
